Franchise Tax Board Settlements
California EDD offers taxpayers tax settlement program, where EDD and taxpayer can settle a claim for less than the amount owed. EDD can settle if it evaluates costs and risks associated with the litigation of the case and determines that it is better and less expensive for EDD to settle for lower amount than to litigate in court. The Settlements Program allows an employer the opportunity to enter into a settlement agreement to also avoid the cost of prolonged litigation associated with resolving a disputed employment tax matter.
For appeal taxpayer should prepare and file a pre-trial brief or memorandum of points and authorities, in which he or she must describe relevant law and apply it to his or her case in support of appeal. Taxpayer may want to locate and interview helpful witnesses, including workers previously interviewed by EDD, principals of business and management employees.
It is important to note that according to Unemployment Insurance Code (“UIC”) Section 1735, an officer, owner or any person in charge of affairs of any corporation, LLC or LLP, is personally liable for the amount of the contributions, withholdings, penalties, and interest unpaid by business entity, if business entity willfully fails to pay the amount. Assessments become delinquent if not paid before they become final, and subject to a penalty of 10%. UIC Section 1135. Sections 1222 and 1224 provide that assessments become final (and delinquent) after 30 days from an assessment date, or if taxpayer petitions or appeals assessment, within 30 days of an Administrative Law Judge or Appeals Board decision date. Therefore, filing an appeal generally extends time to pay tax.
The success or failure of the Dodd-Frank Act will be ultimately judged by history and the impact that it has with combatting some of the problems that have existed with credit rating agencies both before and after the financial crisis of 2008. Already critics have been quick to condemn the act for the perceived over burden that it places on the credit rating agencies or for what others feel is too little regulation that does too little to prevent the evils of the past four decades. Through the research and analysis involved with paper, however, we have come to several conclusions about how the law can be made more effective or where potential shortcomings exist despite its overall intent to promote fairer dealing and more transparency among the agencies.
Consequences for Non-Compliance of the Law
Additional Rules for Credit Rating Agencies Under the Dodd-Frank Act
In addition to administering rating and disclosure rules, The Dodd-Frank Act also imposes several requirements on NRSROs to establish internal control systems that prevents conflicts of interest. The bill’s drafters made it a priority to put certain guidelines in place in order to mitigate the temptation toward favoritism within the rating agencies. Without the conflicts, or with the proper steps to mitigate them, the rationale is that more certainty would exist about the objectivity of the ratings.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) was passed and signed into on July 21, 2010. A small part of this act addressed credit rating agencies and their past practices. The act intends to (1) remove references in statutes and regulations to Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (“NRSROs”), (2) create a new office of credit ratings, (3) to expand conditions that deal with conflicts of interest that may exist both inside the credit rating agencies and with the issuers and underwriters that they deal with, (4) promote rules for better internal governance and control, (5) define new requirements for the board of directors, and (6) institute harsher consequences for non-compliance with the law. [1]
Credit rating agencies have not been held accountable for their ratings. Meaning, an inaccurate rating brings no repercussion to these agencies. If one is not held accountable for their actions, logically there is less incentive to perform well or even at a high standard.
These agencies knew their services were needed under government recommendation yet they were not held to a standard which required the utmost diligence and scrutiny to measure the accuracy of their ratings (15 Chap. L. Rev. 138). This type of attitude towards the agencies allowed the agencies to become comfortable with their existing practices and did not encourage any improvements in the methods these agencies used to rate the instruments.